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No compilation of factors to be considered in applying the balancing
test can be complete because new considerations might be suggested as
case law develops. Additional factors present no burden on the balancing
of factors test. The strength of the test is in its adaptability-it is designed
to include each new factor as a cost or a benefit at the time of the
weighing analysis. The balancing test has been formulated as a solution
to ineffective enforcement of NEPA. The standard determines both the
maximum enforcement of NEPA and the point when imposition of the
requirements of the statute will cause a result unintended by Congress,
thereby avoiding a question of retroactive application. Therefore, in the
future, utilization of the balancing of factors test will be the most efficient
and comprehensive way to determine the applicability of NEPA to ongo-
ing highway projects.
JOEL S. KLINE
SCHOOL DISTRICT CONSOLIDATION: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL UNIT OF EQUALITY
In the eighteen years since the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Board of Education' (Brown I) that separate but equal schools are inher-
ently unequal,2 much progress has been made toward the goal, enunciated
in Brown v. Board of Education3 (Brown II), of achieving "a system of
determining admission to schools on a nonracial basis." 4 In the years
immediately following the Brown 1I decision, the progress was slow as
school boards,5 state legislatures,' and even courts7 attempted to weaken
1347 U.S. 483 (1954).
'Id. at 495.
3349 U.S. 294 (1955).
'Id. at 300-01.
'E.g., School Bd. v. Atkins, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957);
Jackson v. Rawdon, 235 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 925 (1956).
'See generally McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed: Legislative Reaction and Judicial
Development 1956-1957, 43 VA. L. REV. 1205 (1957); Note, Effect of School Assignment
Laws on Federal Adjudication of Integration Controversies, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 537 (1957);
Note, Legality of Plans for Maintaining School Segregation, 54 MICH. L. REV. 1142 (1956).
7For example, in Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1956), the court
stated that the "Constitution, in other words, does not require integration. It merely forbids
discrimination."
In Thompson v. County School Bd., 144 F. Supp. 239, 239-40 (E.D. Va.), affd, 240
F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 911 (1957), the district court stated that "it
must be remembered that decisions of the Supreme Court . . . do not compel the mixing
of different races in the public schools."
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the directive of the Court. More recently, progress toward the goal has
been facilitated by Supreme Court decisions expanding the range of af-
firmative equitable relief that is available.' It would appear, however, that
while the Supreme Court has been expanding the broad contours of ap-
propriate equitable relief, some lower federal courts have been developing
new methods of conceptualizing the basic issue of whether a particular
community or geographic area is operating a unitary or dual school
system.' The problem inherent in this new approach is exemplified by the
recent case of Bradley v. Board of Education.0
In Bradley, District Judge Robert Merhige ordered the public school
system of the city of Richmond consolidated with those of the two sur-
rounding counties of Chesterfield and Henrico. On appeal to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, the decision was reversed." Although Bradley
involves many phases of the school desegregation problem,' 2 one of the
more elusive and potentially significant aspects involves the emerging
concept of the appropriate "unit of equality"'13 in a school desegregation
case. This concept seems to have been of importance to the district court
in determining whether there was a unitary or a dual school system.
Rather than considering the city of Richmond and the counties of Hen-
rico and Chesterfield as three separate entities for the purpose of measur-
ing compliance with the mandate of Brown II,1 the district court found
the area to be a single unit of equality to which one remedial decree could
'See Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. County School Bd., 391
U.S. 430 (1968).
'A unitary school system is a system in which the schools cannot be identified as white
schools or black schools on the basis of student assignment, faculty assignment, or quality
of the facilities. For a situation in which such identifiability was due to state action, see
Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971).
11338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972).
"Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1972).
2For previously reported aspects of Bradley v. School Bd., see 325 F. Supp. 828 (E.D.
Va. 1971) (adoption of desegregation plan involving busing); 53 F.R.D. 28 (E.D. Va. 1971)
(motion for attorneys' fees denied); 324 F. Supp. 456 (E.D. Va. 1971) (motions to prevent
school construction while suit was pending and to implement plan at mid-year denied); 324
F. Supp. 439 (E.D. Va. 1971) (motion to remove judge denied); 324 F. Supp. 401 (E.D.
Va. 1971) (motion to dismiss denied); 324 F. Supp. 396 (E.D. Va. 1971) (motion for 3 judge
district court denied); 317 F. Supp. 555 (E.D. Va. 1970) (where court approved freedom of
choice plan to ensure schools would open in the fall). See also Note, Merging Urban and
Suburban School Systems, 60 GEo. L.J. 1279 (1972); Comment, Civil Rights-Judicial
Consolidation of Public School Districts to Achieve Racial Balance, 25 VAND. L. REV. 893
(1972); Comment, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 470 (1972).
" The unit of equality concept was first explicitly used in Bulluck v. Washington, 468
F.2d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1972) as a term to define the geographic area to which a school
desegregation decree could apply.
"349 U.S. at 300-01. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
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apply. Therefore, while the city and counties might each be operating a
unitary school system, if the area was viewed as a whole the school system
might be considered dual. As previously indicated, the unit of equality
concept appears to be of very recent origin with virtually no substantive
guidelines regarding its appropriateness or its limitations. Examining
Bradley in terms of the unit of equality concept presents an interesting
case for analysis.
Prior to the district court decision in Bradley, the unit of equality
concept appears to have been employed in a school desegregation case
on only one occasion. In Bulluck v. Washington,"5 the plaintiffs sought a
declaratory judgment that a District of Columbia statute, forbidding the
use of federal funds for the education of Washington, D.C. students
outside the District, was an unconstitutional infringement upon efforts to
promote desegregation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia addressed itself to the problem of the relevant constitu-
tional unit of equality involved and reasoned:
[N]o case. . . has ever suggested that concepts of equal protection
require one state to provide educational opportunities equivalent
to those provided by another. The correlative of this proposition
is, of course, that an individual who desires to participate in a
given educational program has a right to participate in programs
equal only to those afforded others by the same system. 6
Under that formulation the question of what constitutes the applicable
unit of equality in Bradley is still not answered. Bulluck, in the context
of the District of Columbia, speaks of equality within an area "no larger
than the state,"' 7 so the case does not shed any light on the problem in
Bradley where the area is a small part of the state. Specifically, the
question is whether the phrase "equal only to those afforded others by
the same system" refers to the state-wide system or to the school system
of a particular school district. Bulluck did not answer that question and
therefore provided only the framework for the unit of equality inquiry
without providing any guidelines for its solution.
In order to evaluate the unit of equality concept in Bradley, it is
necessary to elaborate upon the approach taken in the district court to
justify consolidation, with particular emphasis upon the findings of fact
and the court's interpretation of them. Essentially, the district court
5468 F.2d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The court held there was no constitutional violation
because the District of Columbia students had only the right to participate in programs
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found that segregative patterns in the Richmond metropolitan area
schools resulted from residential segregative patterns encouraged by pub-
lic and private action.' 8 These residential patterns, however, were found
to be due in large part to the manner in which the three school districts
had grown and historically been operated." The effect of residential seg-
regation was found to deprive blacks of their constitutionally protected
right of equal educational opportunity. The district court reasoned that
prior de jure school segregation20 had provided blacks with inferior educa-
tion which had lessened their earning power and narrowed their employ-
ment opportunities. 21 This, in turn, restricted the range of housing options
and confined the blacks to the low-cost housing in the center city and to
a low-skilled job market.2 2 The racial identifiability of the Richmond city
schools was also found to be due in part to school construction policy2
and the actions of certain governmental agencies,24 both state and federal.
The nexus between the foregoing findings of fact and the current
racial identifiability of the metropolitan area schools was that prior de
jure segregation in the schools had reinforced residential patterns, which
thereby continually caused blacks to live close to black schools.2 Thus,
the prior de jure segregation created a symbiotic relationship between
present school locations and residential patterns which is manifested in
the form of racially identifiable schools in the city and two-county area.
In other words, past de jure segregation was the source of present racially
identifiable schools, and subsequent governmental choices regarding size
"338 F. Supp. at 84. See also Brewer v. School Bd., 397 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1968); Davis
v. School District, 309 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1970), affd, 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971). In Davis, the district court stated:
For a school board to acquiesce in a housing development pattern and then
to disclaim liability for the eventual segregated characteristic that such
pattern creates in the schools is for the Board to abrogate and ignore all
power, control and responsibility. A Board of Education simply cannot
permit a segregated situation to come about and then blithely announce
that for a Negro student to gain attendance at a given school all he must
do is live within the school's attendance area. To rationalize thusly is to
be blinded to the realities of adult life with its prejudices and opposition
to integrated housing.
309 F. Supp. at 742.
'1338 F. Supp. at 84.
2See Gomperts v. Chase, 404 U.S. 1237, 1238 (1971), wherein Justice Douglas charac-
terized de jure segregation as "a mandate by the legislature, carried into effect by a school
board, whereby students were assigned to schools solely by race."




2See Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971).
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and locating of schools and low cost housing projects have perpetuated
the segregated neighborhoods originally caused by dejure school segrega-
tion. The result of this process is a never-ending cycle of cause and effect
relationships.
The district court cited current census figures to show the concentra-
tion of blacks within the city of Richmond. The Richmond metropolitan
area (Richmond, and Henrico and Chesterfield counties) had a total
population of 480,840 according to the 1970 census." Of this total, ap-
proximately 25.3% were black? If the metropolitan area is viewed as a
single unit rather than as three separate entities, approximately 85% of
the black population of the area will be found in Richmond. Only about
11.2% of the residents of Chesterfield County and 6.5% of the residents
of Henrico County were black,2 while 41.9% of the residents of Rich-
mond were black.
29
This situation is reflected in the respective school systems. In 1969,
the public schools of Richmond were 70% black. In 1970, a predomi-
nantly white portion of bordering Chesterfield County was annexed to the
city, thereby lowering the black student ratio to 64%. 11 As of May 1,
1970 within the Richmond city system there were three all-black high
schools, two all-black middle schools, and seventeen all-black elementary
schools.32 There were twenty-five schools in which over 90% of the fac-
ulty and staff were black.? The schools in Chesterfield and Henrico
counties, however, were 90.5% and 91.8% white, respectively. 4 Partially
on the basis of these findings, the district court held that the freedom-of-
choice plan then in effect in Richmond" had not achieved the unitary





11338 F. Supp. at 185.
311d.
121d. at 71-72. There are seven high schools, nine middle schools and forty-six elemen-
tary schools in the city of Richmond.
"Id. at 72.
"Id. at 185.
The district court summarized the plan as follows:
The H.E.W. plan was basically a zoning plan, with some clustering
of schools. In setting the zones for the various schools, the drafters of the
plan considered the capacity of the school buildings, the proximity of the
buildings to the pupil population, and factors such as the safety hazards
on the immediate approaches to the schools in relation to where the pupils
lived. The plan was, in essence, a neighborhood plan-a plan which under
certain circumstances undoubtedly would be commendable. By reason of
the residential patterns in the City of Richmond, however, wherein there
1973]
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system required by law."
The district court seems to have based its decision on a belief that
"[e]mployment, education, and housing discrimination foster each other
in the United States; the effects of one are causative of the others; they
are interdependent phenomena."37 Consequently the district court rea-
soned that it was under a duty to take affirmative action to end segrega-
tion where the school boards had defaulted in their responsibility to do
so," and that the court's remedial powers were not limited by the bound-
aries of the Richmond school district. 39 The court found that the bound-
ary lines had not been viewed as barriers when busing had been used to
preserve segregation" and that they should not be viewed as impenetrable
barriers when the purpose was to achieve integration. The remedy of
consolidation was justified on the grounds that Virginia had done all in
its power to frustrate integration" and that these boundary lines were
serving that purpose; that the boundary lines were not drawn along geo-
graphic landmarks or related to any administrative or educational necess-
ities;4" and finally, that the city and two counties were, in reality, a single
demographic entity.
43
In order to buttress its opinion that the city and two counties should
be viewed as a single area, the district court cited many facts illustrating
the large degree of interrelatedness between Richmond and the two coun-
ties. For example, in 1970-71, 45% of the residents of Henrico County
who were employed worked in Richmond;49 according to the 1960 census,
46.1% of the residents of Chesterfield County who reported their place
of employment worked in Richmond.45 A 1967 report prepared by the two
counties recognized that there was a community of interest between the
three jurisdictions as well as a relationship of mutual dependency. 0 The
are with rare exceptions distinct White areas and distinct Black areas, a
true neighborhood school plan of necessity can result only in a system in




Id. at 81-82. See also Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
31338 F. Supp. at 79-80; cf Bradley v. Milliken, Nos. 72-1809-72-1814 (6th Cir. Dec.
8, 1972) at 67.
11338 F. Supp. at 112-13.
"Id. at 81, 92-94.
'2ld. at 84. See also Brewer v. School Bd., 397 F.2d 37, 41 (4th Cir. 1968), in which
the court found unacceptable school zone lines resulting in segregation and not justified by
natural barriers.





city of Richmond and Henrico County had entered into contracts con-
cerning municipal services such as fire protection, water and sewage;
47
and the city school board owns land in Henrico County and has a school
on another site in that county.4" Since 1971, pursuant to statutory provi-
sions, the three-part area has been considered a single school division."
On the basis of these and similar facts, the district court found that the
three-part area was a "single urban community."5 Consequently, the
boundary lines between the school systems should not determine or other-
wise restrict the extent of the remedy,5 since the "officials of the City of
Richmond, Counties of Chesterfield and Henrico, as well as the State of
Virginia, have by their actions directly contributed to the continuing
existence of the dual school system which now exists in the metropolitan
area of Richmond."
52
The district court seems to have been presented with a situation simi-
lar to that involved in Davis v. School District,53 In Davis, the racial
imbalance in the schools was also attributed to residential segregation.
The Sixth Circuit noted that a school board has no obligation to achieve
racial balance in the schools when existing imbalance is not attributable
to school board policies but is solely the result of housing patterns and
other forces beyond the control of the school board."4 However, in Davis,
as in Bradley, the district court felt that the school board's policies con-
tributed to the racial imbalance and that the board could have acted to
alleviate the problem. The district court in Bradley quoted that portion
of the district court opinion in Davis which stated:
When the power to act is available, failure to take the necessary
steps so as to negate or alleviate a situation which is harmful is as
wrong as is the taking of affirmative steps to advance that situa-
tion. Sins of omission can be as serious as sins of commission.
Where a Board of Education has contributed and played a major
role in the development and growth of a segregated situation, the
Board is guilty of dejure segregation . . . .'







0309 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1970), afid, 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 913 (1971).
11443 F.2d at 575.
309 F. Supp. at 741-42.
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authorized by statute. 6 A Virginia statute provided that school boards
and local governments, along with the State Board of Education, had the
power to determine whether school districts should be consolidated. This
statute seems to recognize implicitly the unit of equality concept by per-
mitting two school districts to realize that they have a community of
interest and to ignore the boundary line which separates them. In
Bradley, the district court apparently felt that the school boards had
made no attempt to avail themselves of this statutory prerogative and
thereby reasoned that there was a "sin of omission" warranting relief."
The consolidation plan adopted by the district court in Bradley estab-
lished one school board to administer the metropolitan district; the board
would be composed of four members from Richmond, three from Hen-
rico and two from Chesterfield.5 8 The district would be divided into six
subdivisions, five of which would have student populations of 17,000 to
20,000 with the sixth to have 9,000 students." To accomplish that result,
78,000 children would be bused to school, but the great majority would
attend schools within their subdivision and in no case would there be
busing between noncontiguous subdivisions." The district court found
that the existing transportation system was capable of accommodating
this plan, and that the proposed travel times and distances were reasona-
ble."'
The Fourth Circuit, however, reversed, holding that there was no
constitutional violation.12 Apparently, the Fourth Circuit relied on the
premise that since the three subdivisions had not acted in concert to
produce segregated schools, the unit of equality employed to remedy any
constitutional violation was limited by the tenth amendment to the
boundaries of each school district. Specifically, the court stated:
Because we think the last vestiges of state-imposed segregation
have been wiped out in the public schools of the City of Richmond
and the Counties of Henrico and Chesterfield and unitary school
systems achieved, and because it is not established that the racial
composition of the schools in the city of Richmond and the coun-
ties is the result of invidious state action, we conclude there is no
constitutional violation and that, therefore, the district court judge
exceeded his power of intervention.
3
6VA. CODE ANN. § 22-100.1 et seq. (1964 Repl. vol). However, see VA. CODE
ANN. § 22-30 (Supp. 1972), which bars consolidation without local consent.
11338 F. Supp. at 113.
-462 F.2d 1058, 1072 (Winter, J., dissenting).
59 .d
"Id. at 1073.
"1338 F. Supp. at 188.





The Fourth Circuit relied heavily on the decision of the District Court
of New Jersey in Spencer v. Kugler," asserting that Bradley was indistin-
guishable from Spencer on the facts and thus determinative of the deci-
sion in Bradley.5 In Spencer, the plaintiffs attacked a New Jersey statute
which defined each municipality as a separate school district,6" contending
that this was a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment which operated to cause racial imbalance in the schools. The
district court found that the designation of municipalities as school dis-
tricts was reasonable, particularly in light of the municipal taxing power,
and that the school system was unitary because any racial imbalance
among the school districts was merely a reflection of existing racial im-
balance in the communities."7 The district court held that as long as the
boundary lines were drawn in a reasonable manner and not in a way
which would foster segregation, they were not violative of the command
in Brown I1.68
However, in placing such reliance on Spencer, the Fourth Circuit may
have overlooked certain features that seem to distinguish the two cases.
New Jersey had no history of de jure segregation while Virginia was one
of the last states to abolish such segregation.69 In Spencer, the statute was
directly attacked as unreasonable and drawn to foster segregation; in
Bradley, however, the boundary lines themselves were not attacked as
unconstitutionally drawn or as per se unconstitutional barriers. Rather,
the role played by the boundary lines is secondary; they may be ignored
to remedy a racial imbalance in the schools caused by the state's use of
the lines for segregative purposes, 7 by the blacks' inability to move out-
side the city due to their economic status caused by prior de jure segrega-
11326 F. Supp. 1235 (D.N.J. 1971), affd men., 404 U.S. 1027 (1972).
11462 F.2d at 1070.
"N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, § 8-1 et seq. (1953). Section 1 provides in part that "each
municipality shall be a separate local school district except as otherwise provided in this
chapter .. "
17326 F. Supp. at 1241-43. In Bradley, the Fourt Circuit noted:
If we assume state action to keep blacks confined to Richmond, and none
appears, it is evident that such action has failed to achieve its assumed
invidious purpose. Richmond schools may be getting blacker, but so also
are the schools of Henrico and the trend may soon reach to Chesterfield.
462 F.2d at 1066.
"326 F. Supp. at 1241. However, Mr. Justice Douglas dissented from the Court's
memorandum opinion, stating:
If any form of state-imposed segregation is proved, then the racially hom-
ogeneous neighborhoods and the consequent racial imbalance in schools
would seem to be the result of state action.
404 U.S. 1027, 1028-29 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"See 462 F.2d 1058, 1079 (Winter, J., dissenting).
70338 F. Supp. at 84.
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tion, 71 and by the inaction of the state and its agents to remedy the
situation when a remedy existed.
7
1
In Bradley, the district court found that these lines, maintained as
originally drawn, served to perpetuate the effects of past de jure segrega-
tion.73 Because Virginia adhered to school districting and student assign-
ment based on these lines, something related to private gerrymandering
resulted. Segregated racial patterns had developed due to past de jure
segregation,74 and, due to present inaction by the school board in the face
of the prevailing situation, white families could avoid the consequences
of Brown II by moving across invisible, state-created boundary lines. The
goal of desegregation, the district court in Bradley reasoned, should not
be subordinated to state-created political subdivision lines.7 5
The crux of the difference between the district court and the Fourth
Circuit in Bradley is difficult to isolate, although it appears to center
around the unit of equality concept. While the Fourth Circuit held that
the "last vestiges of state-imposed segregation have been wiped out in the
public schools"" of the three political subdivisions, it specifically ac-
cepted the district court's finding that there has been "state (also federal)
action tending to perpetuate apartheid of the races in ghetto patterns
throughout the city, and that there has been state action within adjoining
counties also tending to restrict and control the housing location of black
residents." However, the Fourth Circuit went on to observe that while
there had been state action within each political subdivision to perpetuate
residential segregation, there was never "joint interaction between any
two of the units involved (or by higher state officers) for the purpose of
keeping one unit relatively white by confining blacks to another. ' 78
Insofar as the unit of equality concept is concerned, one of the basic
problems with the Fourth Circuit's analysis is that it fails to explain the
relevance of the failure to show joint interaction between the subdivisions
for the purpose of keeping them heterogeneous. First, the district court
did not seem to advance that argument or reach that conclusion. The
district court seems only to have found that past de jure segregation,
coupled with present state action, has resulted in a dual system when the
city and two-county area is considered as a whole; and that this system
has been, and will continue to be, self-perpetuating.79 Second, it is particu-
"'See text accompanying notes 19-23 supra.
72See text accompanying notes 50-52 supra.
11338 F. Supp. at 84.
"Id.
"Id. at 83.
1'462 F.2d at 1070.
771d. at 1065.
791d.
"See text accompanying notes 19-23 supra.
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larly difficult to understand the substantive significance that attaches to
a lack of complicity or joint interaction since the Fourth Circuit declined
to indicate, in any manner, what would have been an appropriate course
of action if there had been a showing of complicity.
The Fourth Circuit seems to have said, in effect, that state action
tending to perpetuate residential racial segregation within each political
subdivision did not justify court intervention to relieve its apparent and
inevitable consequence of resulting school segregation throughout the
entire area considered as a whole. The apparent rationale for this conclu-
sion is that because there has been state action only within each subdivi-
sion separately, with no interaction, there existed no justificationfor con-
solidating the area for purposes of effectuating a remedy. In other words,
since any violation of a constitutionally protected right occurred solely
because of action taken by officials of a particular subdivision, the appro-
priae unit of equality is limited by the boundaries of that political subdivi-
sion.
Although the Fourth Circuit stated that it found no state-imposed
school segregation, it did accept findings of state-imposed residential
segregation, of which a natural consequence would seem to be school
segregation. Consequently, the court felt constrained to show that there
had been no complicity between the three subdivisions to accomplish the
resultant school segregation. The court stated:
We think that the root causes of the concentration of blacks in the
inner cities of America are simply not known and that the district
court could not realistically place on the counties the responsibility
for the effect that inner city decay has had on the public schools
of Richmond."°
As noted in the dissenting opinion of Judge Winter, the premise underly-
ing this statement by the majority seems to be that "each subdivision is
free to operate in its own orbit so long as it obeys the fourteenth amend-
ment and does not conspire with others to defeat it."81 Within each of the
three areas there may be a unitary school system; but, if the three areas
are considered as a single entity, as they were by the district court, the
sincle school system is not unitary. Accordingly, the essence of the differ-
ence between the district court and the Fourth Circuit seems to be that
since the state does not treat the three-part areas as a single unit of
equality, the tenth amendment"2 prevents the district court from doing so.
The argument that the integrity of state-created political subdivision
0462 F.2d at 1066.
'Id. at 1076.
"U.S. CONST. amend. X provides:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
1973]
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boundaries is protected by the tenth amendment3 seems to be subject
to some limitations in the context of school desegregation cases. For
example, in Haney v. County Board of Education,4 the Eighth Circuit
noted:
If segregation in public schools could be justified simply be-
cause of pre-Brown geographic structuring of school districts, the
equal protection clause would have little meaning. Such a position
"would allow a state to evade its constitutional responsibility by
carve-outs of small units." 5
This seems to be precisely what the unit of equality concept is designed
to overcome. As a result of state action, and regardless of joint interac-
tion, the district court in Bradley saw, in effect, a "carve-out" and dec-
lined to legitimize it even though the area was a political subdivision. In
Haney, the Eighth Circuit went on to note:
State legislative district lines, congressional districts and other
State political subdivisions have long ago lost their mastery over
the more desired effect of protecting the equal rights of all citi-
zens. . . . Political subdivisions of the state are mere lines of
convenience for exercising divided governmental responsibilities.
They cannot serve to deny federal rights. 6
It seems clear that equal educational opportunity is deemed a fundamen-
tal right in the United States. In Brown I the Supreme Court stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recog-
nition of the importance of education to our democratic so-
ciety. . . .In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reason-
ably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively
or to the people.
"See Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907). The Court noted:
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as
convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers as
may be entrusted to them. . . .The number, nature and duration of the
powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which
they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State.
Id. at 178.
--410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969).
'Id. at 924, quoting Hall v. School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649, 658 (E.D. La.) aff d, 287
F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1961), affd per curiam, 368 U.S. 515 (1962).
31410 F.2d at 924-25. See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has under-
taken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all
on equal terms.87
Consequently, it would appear that the right to equal educational oppor-
tunity is one so fundamental that it outweighs the state's interest in the
sanctity of its political subdivision lines, particularly if those lines operate
to perpetuate school segregation.
The most recent case dealing with consolidation is Bradley v.
Milliken." Confronted with a fact situation very similar to the one exist-
ing in Richmond, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court opinion 9
which ordered the consolidation of the Detroit city schools with those of
the surrounding suburbs. The Sixth Circuit did not mention the unit of
equality concept, but it did decline to follow the Fourth Circuit's reason-
ing, stating:
This record reflects a present and expanding pattern of all black
schools in Detroit (resulting in part from State action) separated
only by school district boundaries from nearby all white schools.
We cannot see how such segregation can be any less harmful to
the minority students than if the same result were accomplished
within one school district.
The instant case calls up haunting memories of the now long
overruled and discredited "separate but equal doctrine" of Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). If we hold that school district
boundaries are absolute barriers to a Detroit school desegregation
plan, we would be opening a new way to nullify Brown v. Board
of Education which overruled Plessy .... 11
The Sixth Circuit relied instead on the large amount of state control
and influence over the educational system' and on two recent Supreme
Court cases9" holding that school boundary lines could not be altered or
new school systems created where the result would be a larger racial
imbalance in school systems in which all vestiges of state enforced segre-
1347 U.S. at 493.
"Nos. 72-1809-72-1814 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, 1972), rehearing granted. See also Keyes v.
School Dist., 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 404 U.S. 1036 (1972); United States
v. School Dist. 151,404 F.2d 1125, 1132-34 (7th Cir. 1968), modified, 432 F.2d 1147 (1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 943 (1971).
"Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
"aNos. 72-1809-72-1814 at 57, 65.
"Id. at 41-49.
2United States v. Board of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972); Wright v. City of Emporia,
407 U.S. 451 (1972).
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gation had not been eliminated." Consequently, the Sixth Circuit rea-
soned that if "school boundary lines cannot be changed for an unconstitu-
tional purpose, it follows logically that existing boundary lines cannot be
frozen for an unconstitutional purpose."94 Thus, it would appear that in
situations wherea dual school system exists, state-created political bound-
ary lines are not to be immovable barriers to the framing of a particular
remedy.
In Bradley, however, the district court not only ignored the boundary
lines in framing a remedy, but also ignored them in making the determi-
nation that a dual school system existed. The district court's consolida-
tion order was in large part based on the premise that these three political
subdivisions were only a single demographic entity, or unit of equality,
and within that unit there was a dual school system.
The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, may have never grasped the
central idea of the district court's opinion that for the purposes of school
desegregation the entire metropolitan area constituted one unit. The great
reliance the Fourth Circuit placed on the lack of complicity and interac-
tion between the subdivisions seems to point to the conclusion that the
court never addressed itself to the unit of equality idea. Consequently, the
Fourth Circuit actually did not deal with the same issue as did the district
court; the district court's findings of fact and decision had a completely
different frame of reference from that of the Fourth Circuit's opinion.
An examination of Bradley in terms of the unit of equality concept
reveals interesting differences in the efforts of the courts to conceptualize
the contemporary school desegregation issues. As indicated at the outset,
the concept is of very recent origin and it seems reasonable to conclude
that further clarification is required if it is to serve as a useful doctrinal
reference. Whether that clarification will be forthcoming, or whether the
concept will be laid to rest at its early stages, should be one of the
questions answered when the Supreme Court decides the Bradley case in
the coming months.
MORGAN 0. DOOLITrLE, III
" Nos. 72-1809-72-1814 at 66.
"Id. at 67.
